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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
January 13, 1978 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 2 
No. 77-642 CFX 
PARKER, acting commissioner 
of Patents and Trademarks 
v. 
FLOOK, patent applicant ----
Cert to CCPA 
(Baldwin fo r the court) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: The SG is petitioning for cert on behalf of the - ~ -
acting commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, arguing that the CCPA 
- -----'-- - ·-
granted a patent on a mathematical algorithm in violation of this 
Court's decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
2. FACTS: In the manufacturing process for petroleum and pe tro-
- chemicals, various "process variables" such as heat, pressure and pro-
duct flow rate must be kept within a specified range. Apparently 






this range varies during the course of the manufacturing process. 
Under the prior art machinery (generally a general-purpose digital ... - ~. ---_,___ -
computer) would continually monitor and measure the "value" of " - --
the process variables. If the value approached a pre-set value 
marking the edge of the range of safety (the "alarm value"), the 
monitoring machinery would set off some type of alarm such as a 
bell or a light. The human operator would then make adjustments 
in the manufacturing process to bring the values back within the 
specified range, thereby insuring efficiency in production and 
safety. Apparently it was also possible during the course of the 
manufacturing process toEllyJ calculat~and modify the alarm 
value so that at the current point in the process that value would 
reflect the most efficient range more accurately than could the 
pre-set alarm value. 
Resp's claim sought a patent for a process that would enable 
the monitoring machi~~ (preferably the ~igital computer) 
§nstantJ])upda~utomatically the alarm value during the 
to 
course 
of the manufacturing process . The novel asEect of the claim is 
an~lgorithm that permits the computer (whether mechanical or 
human, although it will almost surely be the former in the practice) 
to use previously computed values to set the currently controlling 
updated value. The claim extends beyond this, however, to cover 
the application of this computation process to the alarm mechanism. 
The patent examiner found that "the only difference between 
[resp's] claims and the prior art is in the mathematical formula 






then rejected all of resp's claim as nonstatutory subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C. §101, stating that a patent on the claimed me thod 
"would in practical effect be a patent on the formula or mathematics 
itself." Petn, at 8. 
On appeal, the Board of Appeals of the Patent and Tradema rkOffice 
(the Board) sustained the rejection because resp "proposes to use 
conventional automatic alarm adjusting equipment" to implement 
his claimed invention, rendering any inventive contribution that 
he made nothing more than "formulas or algorithm" and therefore 
unpatentable under Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63. Resp 
requested reconsideration, arguing that his claim was unlike 
Benson's and did not cover solely an algorithm because the final 
recited step of his method was not the solution of a mathmatical 
equation but rather the application of such a solution (computed 
in the preceding steps) to a method of regulating a chemical 
process. The Board rejected this distinction as "specious" and 
re-affirmed . 
The CCPA reversed, holding that the claim did not "preempt 
._ 
the f ormul a or algorithm contained therein, because solution 
of the algorithm, per se, would not infringe the claims.'' Petn, 
at Sa. In reaching this conclusion, the court also explained in 
some detail one of its prior decisions applying Benson , In re 
Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392 (CCPA 1973) : 
Chri stensen 's holding of nonstatutory subject matter 
i s expressly limited to claims di r ected to determining data 
used in an algorithm and solving the algorithm, that is, 
to claims in which nothing is done after solution of the 
algorithm. Christense n r e cogn i zed that the absence of a 
step other.than those steps r equire d for solution of the 
algorithm necessarily precludes the possibility that the 





Christensen, reasoned that Benson requires that a claim 
must include a recitation which materially limits the claim 
to a scope less than the mere act of solving an algorithm. 
The court determined thatthis requirement of a limitative 
recitation is not satisfied by the recitation of data-gathering 
steps but implied that it may be satisfied by the recitation 
of some sort of post-solution activity . Because the court 
found no post-solution activity recited in the claims of 
Christens~,the court did not n8ed to reach the question 
of what sort of post-solution activity is required for 
statutory subject matter. Thus, Christen$en does not 
render the claims before us unpatentable, because these 
claims include recitation of post-solution activity, a 
step in which the solution is applied to a control system. 
Petn, at 4a-5a. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG's attack is basically two-pronged. 
~ he argues 
The last step in 
that the decision below conflicts with Benson . 
resp's claim (application of the solution resulting 
from the algorithm to a control system) is not an integral part 
of a new invention, but rather the non-inventive application of a 
mathematical result to existing technology. This does not satisfy 
Benson which (in the SG's view) requires that (1) the process be 
carried out with a specific apparatus devised to implement the 
newly-discovered idea and (2) the claim to a ~onopoly be confined 
to a specific end-use or field of art or technology. See O'Reilly 
v. Mo~, 15 How. 62 (the Telegraph 
126 U.S. 1. . ~~Tne~equirement 
case); The Telephone Cases, 
concededly is satisfied, but 
the first is not: "the claims are not limited to any novel 
apparatus (such as Morse's telegraph apparatus or Bell's mouth-
piece apparatus) devised to carry out the new method. Instead, 
as respondent expressly admitted, the mathematical algorithm 
can be, and indeed is designed to be, 'carried out in existing 
- -
- 5 -
'4it computers long in use' for monitoring and regulating chemical 




-~ C/' the SG argues that the decision below ~ts 
with runk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 
(1948), ¼11ich assertedly stands for the rule that regardless of 
the genius involved in discovering an idea or scientific principle, 
its application must also be inventive for the method or product 
to qualify as patentable subject matter . The only novelty in 
resp's method is in the mathematical formula by which these 
values are calculated. Once resp worked out the equations or 
algorithm for computing the alarm values , each aspect of the 
implementation of this algorithm was straight-forward and conventional. 
As part of a somewhat generalized argument regarding 
certworthiness, the SG asserts that CCPA has been giving Benson 
a strained interpretation, that this has created confusion and 
uncertainty in the administration of the patent laws, that it 
would be disastrous to require these questions to be resolved in 
infringement litigation, and that the ruling below will have a 
debilitating effect on the development of the computer industry. 
Resp follows primarily the same approach adopted by the 
CCPA regarding the absence of total preemption because the 
algorithm is tied to an end-use . The SG's reading of Benson, 
particularly the "two requirement" analysis, is wrong; Benson 
stands only for the proposition that a claim which preempts a 
mathematical formula is not pate~ble. The SG's "point of novelty" 







element in the entire claim, is improper and has been discredited. 
Application of Bernhart and Fetter, 417 F.2d 1395 (CCPA 1969). 
Funk Brothers itself does not address a "point of nove:l.ty" position. 
Finally, the CCPA, contrary to the SG's implication, is indeed 
applying Benson to refuse to grant·patents. Application of de 
Castelet, 562 F.2d 12J6 (CCPA 1977). 
4. DISCUSSION: The SG is reading much more into Benson 
. ~ -~ ----=.: :::::s.. ~ ~ --.e::e::.--_.:::::= _ _ :- - -
than is there. 
~---, = -,-., .. 
The Court was primarily concerned with the almost 
limitless scope of a patent involving a mathematical formula 
that was not tied to any specified end-use. Tha.t problem is, 
of course, not present here. I do not see in Benson any require-
ment that "the process be carried out with a specific apparatus 
devised to implement the newly-discovered idea.'' If, however, 
the Court wishes to impose that requirement in some unmistakable 
fashion, this would be an appropriate case for that purpose. 
But the Court strongly indicated in Benson its belief that Con0ress 
was the superior institution ·to resolve the complex patents 
questions raised by the new compute r technology; the complexities 
of this case (complexities at least to a novice in the field) 
impress me as sup~orting that belief. --------------.~ -----w----- ___,,,.,., ,,,,,.. ~~! 
The resp is correct that Funk Brothers --- as I read that case 
does not support the "point of novelty" argument that the SG 
attempts to construct on it, primarily because the Court was 
concerned there with only a product claim and not with a process 
or "methods" claim such as is presented here. 
There is a response. 
1/4/78 
BE 
Stewart op in petn 
(Ot/Erl) ::::---,,, 
. ~ - - ,. . 
Q Although I cannot speak with any great confidence in 
A.,rJ./ J .-<? this field, the CCPA's interpretation of Gottschalk v. Benson 
· yv, / does not seem totally out of line - although niither is if 
required. In t9ttschalk the Court stressed at least twice 
that the algorithms involved were not,_t:ied to any particular 
_ Y _,. end product: "The claims • were not limlted to any particular 
~ 
art of technology, to any particular apparatus or machinery, 
or to any particular end use. They purported to cover any 
,,,.,-/~se of the claimed method in a general-purpose digital computer V / ~f any type." 409 U.S., at 64. And: "Here the 'process' claim 
~ is so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown 
uses of the [mathematical formula]. The end use may (1) vary 
from the operation of a train to verification of drivers' 
licenses to researching the law books for precedents and (2) a be 
performed through any existing machinery or future-devised machinery 
or without any apparatus." Id., at 68. 
'? I 
.).~ 
Here, on the other hand and as the CCPt~t~ ; 11 1- t~ claim 
4 limited ~o the u~e of the algorithm in aarticularjnc]-u5' and 
with a particular kind of apparatus. 
~ 
The Court has avoided having to interpret Gottschalk at least 
three times since it was decided. In Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 
219 (1976), it held that a patent for an apparatus (not process) 
that consisteda of at U J computor programmed to sort checks 
was not patentable because of obviousness. The CCPA had 
distinguished Gottschalk, but this Court did not have to decide 
whether it was correct in so doing. Two cases earlier this term 
raised• issues similar to that here (in petitions filed by the 
SG), but one was JOT and the other was--• mooted out before the 
I 
Court could act on the petition. The memos in• both those cases 
tended toward a grant. Dann v. Noll, No. 76-1558 (mooted out); 
Dann v. Chatfield, No. 76-1559 (JOT). The CCPA in the instant 
case cited those cases as support. 
½ 
The SG tells us that uncertaintj as to the meaning of 
Gottschalk is delaying and confusing the disposition of many 
applications for patents on computor programs. 600 to 900 such 
applications currently are pending, and abou t 450 new ones are 
filed each year. To my mind, Gottschalk simply does not answer 
the question presented in this petition, but it seems to be one 
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BOB-TAIL BENCH MEMO 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Nancy April 26, 1978 
RE: No. 77-642, Parker v. Flook 
I am afraid that I am not going to be very helpful 
in this, my last, bench memo. The case absolutely baffles 
me. It is difficult for several reasons. First, the 
patent laws generally are new to me, and I do not 
understand some of the basic concepts and how the various 
sections of the statute inter-relate. Second, because of 
my unfamiliarity with the patent law precedent, I am not 
able to reason by analogy from known instances to the issue 








patent to other patentable subjects because I do not know 
of the other subjects. Finally, I do not understand 
exactly what resp's invention does. I do not understand 
how the mathematical equation works; nor do I understand 
exactly how it controls the catalytic conversion process. 
With all these impediments to understanding this 
case, I simply cannot make a recommendation that you vote 
one way or the other. I am not even able to predict what 
the consequences would be of a decision in one direction or 
the other, or to what extent the patentability of computer 
programs is implicated in this case. (Resp's equation may 
be performed either manually--with pencil and paper--or by 
.....,...,_,.- ...... - -general digital computer.) Nevertheless, I will try to set 
out the various ideas that have gone through my head in 
thinking about this case and discussing it with other 
clerks. 
First, an amateur's description of the 
"invention". The patent is on a method for updating alarm 
limits on manufacturing conditions that are monitored 
during the catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons. It seems 
that during the process of catalytic conversion, the 
"process variables"--meaning heat, pressure, etc.--change 
~ over time. If these variables exceed ~ high or low 
limits, there can be safety problems, or the conversion 
process will not work properly. In the past, it seems that 
workers monitored these process variables and guessed at 









success of the process. Then they would "update" the 
- "limits" at which an alarm would go off to signal trouble. 
-
-
Resp's invention is a four-step method for 
continuously updating the "alarm limits". At every step, ...... ,,.,,-, 
it seems, the computer is able to receive the present 
values of each of the variables and calculate what the 
updated alarm limit should be at that point, by virtue of 
the equation in the second step of claimed invention. I do 
not really understand exactly what the computer is doing. 
It seems to be agreed by at least petr and resp 
that the equation in the second step of the claim is 
novel. One of the amici disputes the novelty of the -
mathematical equation, or algorithm. (An algorithm seems 
to be not technically an equation, but a series of steps 
for a computer to perform to solve an equation. I am not 
sure whether the distinction between an equation and an 
algorithm is significant for patent law purposes.) This 
amicus, Association of Data Processing Service 
Organizations (ADAPSO), says that the equation has been in 
the public domain and is published in Brown, Smoothing, 
Forecasting, and Prediction of Discrete Time Series 
(1963). See ADAPSO brief at 7 n. 2. Two of the law clerks 
who have substantial backgrounds in math (Chuck Cole and 
Miles Ruthberg) say that they agree wholeheartedly with the 
amicus that the algorithm is not new. They say that when 
they looked at the equation they were astonished that 






- - 4 • 
Yet petr and resp have proceeded on the premise 
not only that the equation is new, but that it is the only 
thing novel about resp's purported invention. If the Court 
is going to adjudicate this case, it must do so on the 
basis of the assumption that the algorithm itself is new, 
even though it appears that this is an erroneous premise. 
Assuming that the algorithm is new, petr (the 
Acting Commissioner of Patents, or Commissioner) contends 
that a procedure whose only point of novelty is a 
mathematical formula does not fall within any one of the 
four statutory categories of patentable subject matter 
under 35 u.s.c. § 101. That section provides: 
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof may obtain a patent therefor 
..•. " (emphasis supplied). 
Resp contends that he has applied for a patent on a 
process, which is one of the four statutory subjects. Resp 
and his amici also contend that petr has distorted the 
normal patent inquiry by making "novelty" or "invention" an 
element of§ 101 when these really should be considered 
only under§§ 102 and 103 (dealing, respectively, with 
novelty and obviousness). Section 101, says resp, only 
sets out the categories of statutory subjects. 
In the long run, resp probably should not be able 
to get a patent. This is because the only novelty in his 
claim, if any, is the equation that is plugged in to step 2 






accepted by both sides in this case that one cannot obtain 
a patent on an idea, or a force of nature, because these 
are not statutory subject matter under§ 101. Thus, either 
~~~ 
resp's whole claim is non-statutory matter under§ 101; or, 
A 
under either§ 102 or§ 103, his claim is not novel or 
obvious because the only thing new about it is the novel 
algorithm, which itself is not patentable. 
Thus, the whole dispute boils down to the question 
whether the Patent Office can reject resp's claim at the 
outset under§ 101 or whether it must go through the 
inquiries mandated by§§ 102 and 103. This is more than an 
academic dispute, in two respects. First, if petr prevails 
the Patent Office ~ be relieved of examining all the 
patent applications that disclose computer programs. 
Second, and tied to the first point, if petr prevails it is 
likely that computer programs will never be patentable 
because they involve the equivalent of a human being's 
mental steps, or ideas. One of the reasons why I feel so 
uncomfortable about this case is that the Court's holding 
could have a great impact on the computer industry which I 
am not in a position to understand or anticipate. I am not 
sure how a holding in petr's favor would affect the 
industry. 
Resp's argument is fairly straitforward. Resp 
says that the only inquiry under§ 101 should be whether 
the claim discloses a process. Here, the claim manifestly 
discloses a process for updating alarm limits. To be sure, 
- -
6. 
the process includes an algorithm. But if the claim 
- discloses a process under§ 101, then the inquiry would be 
whether the process is "novel" under§ 102. My guess is 
that this claim would not satisfy the requirements of§ 102 
because the process (meaning the several steps of 
discerning the present values of the process variables, 
figuring out their updated values, and updating the alarm 
limits) is old. It has been done until now in a rough way, 
-
-
but the steps were the same. (This assumes that the 
"process" is made up of the 4 steps set out in resp's 
claim. I suppose it could be argued that the "process" 
also comprises the sub-steps, including the particular 
steps through which one goes in solving resp's algorithm.) 
Yet resp argues that the Patent Office should have to go 
through the steps of determining whether use of the 
mathematical algorithm contributes enought that is "new" to 
the process to make the overall invention novel. 
Petr short-circuits the process. He says that if 
we know from the outset that the only novelty in resp's 
claim is the mathematical algorithm, which itself is not 
patentable, it is clear from the start that the invention 
is not going to be patentable~ Petr seems to focus on the 
new element of the whole claim, rather than the claim as a 
whole. 
I have read a number of the cases, but I do not 
have a good grasp of how to tell when a claimed invention 
involves a new and useful application of principles and 
ti,;} i} #,J 11,ert i} no pafenfAb/e i" vinho11 JI A,o~v w1 of so, ;"J whtr1 tlie o"I c. J ;,., TD in Ve,/\ f i 01\ A. modAern~f;,~/ for-mt1!1t or' 
-Lt PelY ~,, re~f co.nnof 






when the claim involves the principles themselves. In the 
former case, there is patentable subject matter under 
§ 101, but not in the latter. Benson, of course, involved 
7. 
a patent on an algorithm for a computer to convert binary ------------coded numbers into pure binary numbers. The Court (per 
Douglas, J.) said that this amounted to a claim to the 
algorithm itself and therefore was unpatentable. The 
patent would have completely preempted use of the 
algorithm. 
I do not know whether Benson was right or wrong. 
Assuming it was right, the court below in this case 
distinguished the instant case on the ground that a patent 
on resp's method would be limited to the end use of 
calculating alarm limits on hydrocarbon cracking. We do 
not know whether there exist any other uses for resp's 
algorithm. Thus it could be that it, too, would preempt 
all use of the algorithm, but at least it is tied to a 
particular end use. This is relevant because the rationale 
J 
behind not allowing patents on abstract ideas is not only H /a f 
[based. tn II)( " / 
to preserve those ideas for the use of all mankind, but i s .[ 
that the purpose of the patent laws is not to give thinkers 
and inventors monopolies on abstract ideas, but to require 
that they somehow use the idea in a practical invention. -
\ It is not enough to think a brilliant thought; the inventor 
must somehow put it to a new and practical use. 
Resp here seems to have satisfied that test. But 
the problem is that the same could have been said of the 
- - 8. 
patent applicant in the Funk case (cited in the briefs), 
4t where a patent was denied. In Funk the inventor discovered 
-
\ -
that certain bacteria do not inhibit each other. Formerly, 
on 
the bacteria had been sold separately for use ft different 
~ 
plants. Funk's discovery enabled him to package the 
bacteria together, and the packaged product then could be 
used on a wider variety of plants. The Court (again 
Justice Douqlas) held that this was not statutory 
the effect of the bacteria on each other itself was not 
patentable, because it was a law of nature. Once the 
discovery was made, there was nothing novel or unobvious 
about putting the bacteria together. 
of 
The Funk case is very strong support for petr. He 
uses it to say that once resp discovered the equation that 
explains how the process variables in the hydrocarbon 
cracking process will change, it was a simple step to plug 
in that equation to the _old updating process. The Funk 
test--and petr's proposed test--would look at the discovery 
and the implementation separately. If the discovery is 
novel but unpatentable because it is just a discovery of a 
natural principle, then there must be novely of 
implementation to make the whole process patentable. 
While petr's test conforms to ~unk, it is hard to 
answer resp's charge that petr is dividing up the 
applicant's claim in an impermissible manner. Under§ 103 
(the obviousness section) the patent examiner is not 
- -
9 • 
supposed to look at each element of the claim to see 
- whether it is novel. He is supposed to look at the claimed 
invention as a whole. If the examiner could proceed 
step-by-step through the claim, each step probably would 
seem obvious from the preceding step. The examiner i s 
supposed to look to see whether the whole invention, 
including the first step, is novel and non-obvious from 
what went before. 
-
-
In addition, resp points out that many inventions 
(
' use principles of nature. For example, in the Eibel case 
(cited in the briefs), a patent issued on an invention that 
involved no more than tilting a paper-manufacturing machine 
to utilize the force of gravity. But it seems to me that 
petr is right in saying that this case is not analogous to 
the instant case. In Eibel, application of the force of 
gravity to the paper-making machine was itself inventive 
and novel. The applicant did not claim to have discov~red 
gravity; but he applied the principle of gravity in a new 
and useful way. Here, on the other hand, the applicant's 
new discovery was the equation. If the equation had been 
known before (as the principle of gravity was known before 
the Eibel invention), it would be obvious that it should be 
plugged into the alarm limit updating process. 
The problem is, however, to figure out whether the 
fact that the only new thing about this process is the 
algorithm makes the subject matter non-statutory under§ 
101 or not novel or obvious under§§ 102 or 103, 
- -
10. 
respectively. In thinking about this case, I have found 
- that it looks like it is non-statutory under§ 101 when 
compared to certain cases (like Funk), but it looks like 
it's an obviousness problem under§ 103 when compared to 
cases like the Eibel case. Certainly the fact that the 
principle of gravity was involved in Eibel did not 
automatically make the claim non-statutory under§ 101. 
-
-
Petr's argument cannot be that a claim is 
non-statutory simply because a principle of nature is 
involved in the invention. Petr's position is much 
narrower, namely, that when it appears that the only 
novelty in the invention is the discovery of a principle of 
nature, and there is no novelty in its application, it is 
as if the claim were for the abstract principle itself. 
This approach seems to be reflected in the CCPA's decision 
in In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392 (attached). 
Christensen was distinguished by the CCPA in the instant 
case on the ground that here there was a step in the 
process after solution of the algorithm, whereas in 
Christensen there was only the solution of a formula. This 
distinction seems to be responsive to Benson's concern that 
a patent on a process not really be a patent on a formula 
or algorithm, but it seems to evade the rule that one 
cannot patent an idea simply by adding a physical 
implementation of that idea after solution of a formula. 
But this practical application of the idea may be enough to 
take us from the realm of purely abstract thinking into 






I think I will not say anymore, because my 
ramblings probably will not be very helpful. I simply have 
not been able to make much sense of the arguments in this 
case. I would recommend strongly that you defer to the 
judgment of any Justice who believes he understands this 
case. I do not think I could make any better sense of it 
in attempting to write an opinion than I have thus far, 
because the concepts are so far over my head. I am 
attaching copies of some of the basic treatise material on 
patentable subject matter, and some of the recent CCPA 
cases involving problems of computer algorithms and 
equations. I've also attached Benson and funk. Maybe you 
will find some help in them. 
In conclusion, I am virtually certain that this 
"invention" is not patentable. All resp has done is to 
discover an equation explaining something about the -------- - - -chemical reactions of the process variables, and to use 
____.--,...__. ,,,-,,"™""' a...w,1.,-,, ..... 
this equation either manually or by computer to update the 
alarm limits His formula does not even do anything; it 
just gets plugged in to a preexisting process. The Funk ---------------------------case is very strong support for petr's approach that when 
I 
the only novelty of a claimed invention is in the discovery 
of a law of nature, the subject matter is not patentable at 
all under§ 101. The only time the requirement of§ 101 is 
met in the context of use of a law of nature is when the 
application of the law itself is inventive. On the other 







says that this is an inquiry under§§ 102 and/or 103, 
not§ 101. 
Something additional has just occurred to me about 
Funk. The product supposedly invented in that case does not 
seem to fall under any one of the four categories set out 
in§ 101. It certainly is not a manufacture or a machine. 
It is unclear whether Funk contended that his invention was 
a process or a composition of matter. It has 
not been treated as a process case, because in Benson 
the Court distinguished the process claim there from the 
claim in Funk. Funk must have contended that he had invented 
or discovered a composition of matter. It is easier to see 
why a composition of matter that preexisted in nature would 
not be patentable than a process explaining a natural 
phenomenon and then using it. But methods of doing things 
are not necessarily processes under the patent laws, even 
if they are useful and have practical results. For example, 
business methods are not patentable. 
The definition of 11 Qroc e,s~ " for purposes of § 101 " ............ ,.,-, ... 
has been stated as follows: "A process is a mode of treatment 
of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an 
act, or series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to 
be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing." 
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1877) (quoted in the attached 
copy from the patent law treatise). The element of transformation 
seems to be critical because that is what distinguishes, for 






It seems to me that resp's method of measuring process 
variable and updating alarm limits might be analogized to 
business methods, for their is no transformation of a 
material as there is during a manufacturing process. The 
catalytic cracking of hydrocarbons of course is a process, 
but that is not the process on which resp seeks a patent. 
------------w........_. ........ -He seeks a patent on the ~xa«exx method of calculating and 
updating these alarm limits. Perhaps if you read the 
attached treatise excerpt on the meaning of "process", some 
of this will be clearer. Since resp's purported "process" 
does not transform anything, maybe petr is right that it 












SUPPLEMENT TO BENCH MEMO 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Nancy April 27, 1978 
RE: No. 77-642, Parker v. Flook 
I hate to burden you with further discussion of this 
case, but I think these additional thoughts may be helpful. 
They arose in conversations with Chuck Cole (BRW's clerk) 
and Barbara Hauser (PS' clerk). 
First, a refinement of the explanation of the process. -It seems that the problem with the guesswork method of 
setting and updating the alarm limits is that the alaxm 
danger zone is not fixed or absolute. Rather, it varies 






I'll use heat as an example. According to my current 
understanding of the facts, the problem is not that the 
catalytic conversion process becomes dangerous when the 
temperature reaches 100 degrees or becomes ineffective 
2. 
when the temperature drops to 10 degrees. Instead, the levels 
~aiRx of danger or ineffectiveness of the system are 
defined in relation to the present value of the variable 
(the present telllillerature, in this example). Th.e alarm 
should go off when the temperature goes a certain amount 
above or below the present temperature, in conjunction with 
the present value of a number of other variables. Th.is 
sounds a little strange to me, but apparently that is why 
the alarm limits could not just be set at the outset and 
then left alone. 
Second, Chuck has mentioned to me that BRW thinks -that if this "invention" is ruled to be statutory subject 
matter under§ 101, it cannot be thrown out under§ 102 or 
§ 103.ke«aHXe Under at least the latter section, as mentioned 
in my memo, the examiner must look at the whole claim in 
determining obviousness; he cannot compartmentalize the 
(1) 
claim and then say xkaxxke«aHxe/the basic idea was novel, 
but unpatentable as an abstract idea, and xkeee (2) the 
implementation of the basic idea, once discovered, was 
akxiaHKRHK obvious. Under§ 103, the claim must be 
considered as a whole in determining whether it is obvious. 
If BRW is right about this, then the SG's position carries 






Third, Chuck has suggested that the practical 
impac t of this decision probably would be much greater 
3. 
if the Court reversed than if it affirmed. If the Court 
holds this particular process patentable, there always is 
the possibility that the decision will be limited to its 
{acts (if anyone can figure out what those are). If, on 
the other hand, the Court reverses, the implications 
probably will be much more widespread, including affecting 
sxkex areas of patent law other than those involving 
computer progrmns. Affirming would just leave things to 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
April 28, 1978 
Re: No. 77-642 - Parker v. Flook 
Dear Chief: ~-~ 
After further consideration, I change my,<\te from 




The Chief Justice 
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JUSTICE W>< . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
June 8, 1978 
RE: No. 77-642 Parker v. Flook 
Dear John: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
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Dale R. Flook. 
On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
of Customs and Patent 
Appeals. 
[June - , 1978.] 
MR. JUSTICE STEYENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Respondent applied for a patent on a "Method For Updat-
ing Alarm Limits." The only novel feature of the method is 
a mathematical formula. In Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 
63, we held that the discovery of a novel and useful mathe-
matical formula ma.y not be patented. The question in this 
case is whether the identification of a limited category of use-
ful, though conventional, post-solution applications of such 
a formula makes respondent's method eligible for patent 
protection. 
I 
An "alarm limit" is a number. During catalytic conver-
sion processes, operating conditions such as temperature, pres-
sure, and flow rates are constantly monitored. ·when any of 
these "process variables" exceeds a predetermined "alarm 
limit," an alarm may signal the presence of an abnormal con-
dition indicating either inefficiency or perhaps danger. Fixed 
alarm limits may be appropriate for a steady operation, but 
during t,ransient operating situations, such as start-up, it may 
be necessary to "update" the alarm limits periodically. 
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elating alarm limits. In essence, the method consists of three 
steps: an initial step which merely measures the present value 
of the process variable ( e. g., the temperature); an intermedi-
ate step which uses an algorithm 1 to calculate an updated alarm 
limit value; and a final step in which the. actual alarm limit 
is adjusted to the updated value. 2 The on ly difference be-
tween the conventional methods of changing alarm limits and 
that described in respondent's application rests in the second 
step-the mathematical algorithm or formula. Using the 
formula, an operator can calculate all updated alarm limit 
once he knows the original alarm base. the appropriate margin 
of safety, the time interval that should elapse between each 
updating. the current temperature ( or other process variable), 
and the appropriate weighting factor to be used to average the 
original alarm base and the current temperature. 
The patent application does not purport to explain how to 
select the appropriate margin of safety . the weighting factor, 
or any of the other variables. Nor does it purport to contain 
any disclosure relating to the chemical processes at work_. the 
monitoring of process variables. or the means of setting off an 
alarm or adjusting an alarm system. All that it provides is a 
formula for computing an updated alarm limit. Although 
the computations can be made by pencil and paper calcula-
tions, the abstract of disclosure makes it clear that the formula 
is primarily useful for computerized calculations producing 
automatic adjustments in alarm settings.3 
The patent claims cover any use of respondent's formula for 
updating the value of an alarm limit on any process variable 
involved in a process comprising the catalytic chemical con-
1 We use the word "algorithm" in this case, a.s we did in, Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 , to mea n ''La] procedure for ;:;olving a given type 
of mathematical problem . . . :" 
"Claim 1 of the patent is :-et fo1th in thE' nppenclix to this opinion, 
which al;:;o contains a more complete de,;cription of these three ;:;tep,;. 
3 App., u.t 13. 
-
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3 
version of hydrocarbons. Since there are numerous processes 
of that kind in the petrochemical and oil refining industries,"' 
the claims cover a broad range of pote11tial uses of the method. 
They do not, however, cover every couceivable application of 
the formula. 
II 
The patent examiner rejected the application. He found 
that the mathematical formula, constituted the only difference 
between respondent's claims and the prior art and therefore a 
patent on this method "would in practical effect be a patent 
on the formula or mathematics itself." " The exami1ier con-
cluded that the claims did not describe a discovery that was 
eligible for patent protection. 
The Board of Appeals of the Patent and Trademark Office 
sustained the examiner·s rejection. The Board also concluded 
that the "point of novelty in [respondent's] claimed method" 6 
lay in the formula or algorithm described in the claims, a sub-
ject matter that was unpatentable under Benson , supra. 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed. 559 
F. 2d 21. It read Benson as applying only to claims that 
entirely pre-empt a mathematical formula or algorithm, and 
noted that respondent was only claiming on the use of his 
method to update alarm limits in a process comprising the 
catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons. The court 
reasoned that since t.he mere solution of the algorithm would 
not constitute infringement of the claims, a patent on the 
method would not pre-empt the formula. 
The acting Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks filed 
1 Example:, mentionrd iu t he Rb~tract. of di::<closure include nRphtha 
reforming, petroleum dist illatP and pet rolcum residuum rracking, hydro--
cracking and dernlfurizat iou. aromatic h~·drocarbon Rnd paraffin i~omeriza-
tion and disproportionation , paraffin-olefin alkylat ion and the like. Id ., 
at 8. 
5 Id., at 47. 
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a petition for a writ of certiomri, urging that the decision of 
~ and Patent Appeals will have a debilitat ... 
ing effect on the rapidly expanding computer "software' ' ind us ... 
try,7 and will require him to process thousands of additional 
patent applicatiom,. Because of the importance of the ques ... 
tion, we granted certiorari, - U.S.-. 
III 
This case turns entirely on the proper construction of § 101 
of the Patent Code, which describes the subject matter that is 
eligible for patent protection. ' It does not involve the famil~ 
iar issues of novelty aud obviousness that routinely arise 
under § § 102 and 103 when the validity of a patent is chal-
lenged. For the purpose of our analysis, we assume that 
respondent's formula is novel an<l useful and that he dis .. 
covered it. Vv e also assume. since respondent does not cha} .. 
lenge the examiner's finding, that the formula is the only 
novel feature of respondent's method. The question is 
whether the discovery of this feature makes an otherwise con 9 
ventional method eligible for patent protection. 
The plain language of § 101 does not answer the question. 
It is true . as respondent argues, that his method is a "process" 
in the ordinary sense of the word. 9 But that was also true 
7 The term '·,;ofhrnre" i~ m;ed in the indust ry to de::;cribe computer pro-
grams. The value of compnter programs in 11,-;e in the United State:; in 
1976 was placed at $4:3.I billion, and projected at $70.7 billion by 1980 
according to one indu;:tr~· e,;timat.e. See Brief AmiCL1~ Curiae for the 
Computer and Bu~ine,;s Equipment :.Janufacturer,; A,;::;ociation, at 17-18. 
8 35 U.S. C. § 101 provide:,;: 
" Whoever invrnb or di::;cove1'l:' any new a11d u:;eful proces:s, machine, 
manufacturr, or composition of matter , or any new a!ld w,rful improvrment 
thereof ma~· obtain a p:t1ent therefor, subject to the conditions and re-
quirements of thi :,; title." 
Section 100 (b) provide,-: 
"The term ·proce:,;:,; ' m ea ns proce~s, a rt. or method, and includr,; a new 
use .of a known prore:,;:,; , machine, ml1Jlufacture, composition of rnattE'I', or 
n1aterial." 
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of the algorithm, which described a method for converting 
binary coded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals, 
that was involved in Gottschalk v. Benson. The holding· that 
the discovery of that method could not be patented as a 
"process" forecloses a purely literal reading of ~ 101.10 ~ 
that an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is 
like a law of nature , tHttJr applied the established rule that a { ~ 
law of nature cannot be the subject of a patent. Quoting · 
from earlier cases, we said: 
" 'A principle. in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an 
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no 
one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.' Le 
Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156. 175. Phenomena of nature, 
though just discovered. mental processes, and abstract 
intellectual concepts are not patentable. as they are the 
basic tools of scientific and technological work." 409 
U.S., at 67. 
The line between a patentable "process" and an unpatenta-
ble "principle" does not always shimmer with clarity. Both 
are "conception [s] of the mind, seen only by [their] effects 
when being executed or performed." Tilghman v. Proctor, 
102 U. S. 707, 728. In Benson we concluded that the process 
application in fact sought to patent an idea. noting that: 
"The mathematical formula involved here has no sub-
stantial practical application except in connection with 
a digital computer, which means that if the judgment 
argument. can be made, however, t.lrnt this Court has on!~· rrcognized a 
proces;; a;:; within the statutory definition when it either wa_,; tied to a 
particular apparatus or operated to change matrriab to a "different ~tate 
or thing." Sre Cochrane , ·. Deener, 94 U. S. 780, 787-788. A,:; in Benson, 
we a::;sume that a valid proce:,;,:; patent may issue rven if it does not meet 
one of these qualifications of our ea.rlier precedents. 409 U. S .. at 71. 
i,i In Benson we phra:::ed the i;:;sue in thi,:; way: 
··The question is whethE>r the method de:;cribed and claimed is a 
·
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below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the· 
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a 
patent on the algorithm itself." 409 U. S., at 71-72. 
Respondent correctly points out that this language does 
not apply to his claims. He does not seek to "wholly pre-
empt the mathematical formula," since there are uses of his 
formula outside the petrochemical and oil refining industries 
that remain in the public domain . And he argues that the 
presence of specific "post-solution" activity-the adjustment 
of the alarm limit to the figure computed according to the for-
mula-distinguishes this case from Benson and makes his 
process patentable. We cannot agree. 
The notion that post-solution activity, 110 matter how con-
ventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable 
principle into a patentable process exalts form over substance. 
A competent draftsman could attach some form of post-solu-
tion activity to almost any mathematical formula; the Pythar-
gorean Theorem would not have been patentable, or partially 
patentable, because a patent application contained a final 
step indicating that the formula. when solved, could be use-
fully applied to existing surveying techniques.n The concept 
of patentable subject matter under § 101 is not "like a nose 
of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction .... " 
White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51. 
Yet it is equally clear that a process is not unpatentable 
simply because it contains a law of nature or a mathematical 
algorithm. See Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota and Ontario 
n It should be noted that in Benson there was a ;;pecific end use con-
templated for the algorithm-utilization of the algorithm in computer 
programming. See Application of Chatfield, 545 F . 2d 152, 161 (CCPA 
1976) (Rich, J., di,;;;enting). Of course, as the Court pointed out, the 
formula, had no other pr:1rtica l a.pplication ; but it is not ent.ire[~, clear 
why a proce::;s claim is :my more or less patentable because the ,-;pecific 
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Paper Co., 261 U. S. 45 ; Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707.12 
For instance, in Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co. v. Radio 
Corporation of America, 306 U. S. 86, the applicant sought 
a patent on a directional antenna system in which the wire 
arrangement was determined by the logical application of a 
mathematical formula. Putting the question of patentability 
to one side as a preface to his analysis of the infringement 
issue, Mr. Justice Stone, writing for the Court, explained: 
"While a scientific truth . or the mathematical expres-
sion of it, is not patentable invention. a novel and useful 
structure created with t-he aid of knowledge of scientific 
truth may be." 306 U. S., at 94. 
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kala Co., 337 U. S. 127, 130, ex-
presses a similar approach: 
"He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon 
of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law 
recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a dis-
covery, it must come from the application of the law of 
nature to a new and useful end." 
Mackay Radio and Funk Bros. point to the proper analysis 
for this case: The process itself, not merely the mathematical 
1 2 In Eibel Process Co. the Court upheld a pa.tent on an improvement 
on a. papermaking m~1chine tha.t made use of the la.w of gravity to enhan ce 
tlw flow of t he product . The patentre, of coun;e, did not claim to have 
discovered the force of gravity, but that force was an element in his novel 
conception. 
Tilghman v. Proctor involved a process claim for " the manufacturing 
of fa t acids and glycerine from fatty bodies." The Court distinguished 
t he process from the principle involved as follows: 
" [T ] he claim of the patent is not for a mere. principle. The chemical 
principle or 8Cientifi c fac t, upon which it is founded is, that the elements 
of neutral fat require to be severally unit ed with an atomic equiva lent of 
water in order to i;eparate from each other and become, free. This chemi-
cal fa ct wm; not discovered b~, Tilghm '.rn. He only claims to ha.ve in-
vented a. pa rticular mode of bringing about the desired chemical union 
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algorithm, must be new and useful. Indeed, the novelty of 
the mathematical algorithm is not a determining factor at all. 
Whether the algorithm was in fact known or unknown at the 
time of the claimed invention , as one of the "basic tools of 
scientific and technological work,·, see Gottschalk v. Benson, 
supra, 409 U. S .. at 67. it is treated as though it were a famil-
iar part of the prior art. 
This is also the teaching of our landmark decision in 
O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62. In that case the Court 
rejected Samuel Morse's broad clajm covering any use of elec-
tromagnetism for printing intelligible signs. characters or let-
ters at a distance. Id., at 112-121. In reviewing earlier cases 
applying the rule that a scientific principle cannot be patented, 
the Court placed particular emphasis on the English case of 
Neilson et al. v. Harford, Webster 's Patent Cases 275. which 
involved the circulation of heated air in a furnace system to 
increase its efficiency. The/argument that the patent merely 
covered the principle that,t, • it1~hot air, instead of coldV'7";) 
into the furnace would increase its temperature was rejected. V 
~· h~Tho E:ngl~sh,court's explanation of its decision was relied on by 
T at h. C . M t 1s ourt m orse: 
"'It is very difficult to distinguish it [the Neilson 
patent] from the specification of a patent for a principle, 
and this at first created in the minds of the court much 
difficulty; but after full consideration we think that the 
plaintiff does not merely claim a principle. but a machine, 
embodying a principle, and a very valuable one. We 
think the case must be considered as if the principle being 
well known, the plaintiff had first invented a mode of 
applying it .... " 15 How., at 115 ( emphasis added) .1 3 
We think this case must also be considered as if the principle 
or mathematical formula ,,·ere well known. 
15 See also Risdo11 Locomotive Works Y. Jledart , 158 U. S. 68; Tilghman 
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Respondent argues that this approach improperly imports 
into § 101 the considerations of "inventiveness" which are 
the proper concerns of §§ 102 and 103.1-1 This argument is 
based on two fundamental misconceptions .. 
First, respondent incorrectly assumes that if a process appli-
cation implements a principle in some specific fashion, it auto-
matically falls within the patentable subject matter of § 101 
and the substantive paten tability of the particular process 
can then be determined by the conditions of § 102 and § 103. 
This assumption is based on respondent's narrow reading of 
Benson, s'Upra, and is as untenable in the context of § 101 as 
it is in the context of that case. It would make the deter-
mination of patentable subject matter depend simply on the 
draftsman's art and would ill serve the principles underlying 
the prohibition against patents for "ideas" or phenomena of 
nature. The rule that the discovery of a, law of nature can-
not be patented rests, not on the notion that natural phe-
nomena are not processes, but rather on the more fundamental 
understanding that they are not the kind of "discoveries" that 
the statute was enacted to protect. 1 5 The obligation to deter-
J> Sections 102 and 103 rstablish errtain conditions, such as novelty and 
nonobviousnr:;s, to patentability. 
1 " The 1111clerl~·ing notion i:; that a scientific prin ciple, ::;uch as that ex-
pre:;:;ecl in responclent.'s algorithm, re,·eals a relationship that has always 
exi:;t~cl. 
'·An examplr of such a cli::;covery [of a scientific principle] was Newton's 
form11l,1tion of the law of universa l gravitation, rr lat ing the force of attrac-
tion betwe!'n two bodie:,;, F, fo their masses, m and m' , and the :;quare 
of 11w di:;tance, cl, between their centers, according to the equation 
F = mm' / d:i. But thi:,; relationship always exist.eel-even before Newton 
announcrd hii;: celebrated law. Such 'mere' recognition of a theretofore 
rxi:;ting phenomenon or relation:;hip carries with it no rights to exclude 
e ther:; from it:,; en.io.n11eni. . . . Patentable :,;ubject matter must be new 
(now]) ; not mrrel~· heretoforr unknown. There is a very compelling 
rrn;-;on for thi,; rulr. Thr reason is founded upon the propostion that in 
grnnting patent rights, the public must not be deprived of any rights that 
it. illf'rrtofore free]~- enjoyrd ." P. Rosenberg, Patent. Law Fundamentals,, 
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mine what type of discovery is sought to be patented must 
precede the determination of whether that discovery is, in 
fact , new or obvious. 
Second. respondent assumes that the fatal objection to his 
application is the fact that one of its components-the mathe-
matical formula-consists of unpatentable subject matter. 
In countering this supposed objection. respondent relies on 
opinions by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals which 
reject the notion "that a c1airn may be disected. the claim 
components searched in the prior art. and, if the only com-
ponent found novel is outside the statutory classes of inven-
tion. the c1aim may be rejected under 35 r. S. C. § 101." 
Application of Chatfield, 545 F . 2d 152. 158 (CCPA 1976) .' 6 
Our approach to respondent's application is. however. not at 
all inconsistent with the view that a patent claim must be 
considered as a whole. Respondent's process is unpatentable 
under § 101 not because it contains a mathematical algorithm 
as one component, but because once that algorithm is assumed 
to be within the prior art, the application. considered as a 
whole. contains no patentable invention. Even though a 
phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula. may be we11 
known. an inventive application of the principle may be 
patented. Conversely. the discovery of such a phenomenon 
cannot support a patent unless there is some other inventive 
concept in its application. 
Here it is absolutely c1ear that respondent's application con-
tains no claim of patentable invention. The chemical proc-
esses involved in catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons are 
well known; as are the practice of monitoring the chemical 
process variables. the use of alarm limits to trigger alarms. 
the notion that alarm limit values must be recomputed and 
11; Sc•ction 103, b~· ib o\\·11 term:; . require;; tha t a determination of ob-
,·ion,;nr,-;,-; hr madr h~· co11:-:i<lPri11g ' ·the ;:nbject m ntt Pr a;, a. who]P. " 35 
U. S. C. § 103-; Of co111.« thi,- d(.)('S 11ot nere:s:;aril~· reqnirP that ana l~·sis 
of what i~ patr11table subject matter und Pr § 101 pror~ on t he sa me ba,; i,:; 
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11 
readjusted , and the use of computers for "automatic process 
monitoring-alarming." 1 • R espondent's application simply 
provides a new and presumably better method for calculating 
alarm limit values. If we assume that that method was also 
known , as we must under the reasoning in Morse , then re-
spondent's claim is, in effect, comparable to a cla.im that the 
formula 2 / r can be usefully applied in determining the cir-
cumferen;; of a wheel. 18 As the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appea1s has explained. "if a claim is directed essentially to a 
method of calculating. using a mathematical formula, even if 
the solution is for a specific purpose , the claimed method is 
nonstatutory." Application of Richman, 563 F. 2d 1026, 1030 
(1977) . 
To a large extent our conclusion is based on reasoning 
derived from opinions written before the modern business of 
developillg programs for computers was conceived. The 
youth of the industry may explain the complete absence of 
precedent supporting patentability. Neither the dearth of 
precedent, nor this decision. should therefore be interpreted 
as reflecting a judgment that patent protection of certain 
novel and useful computer programs will not promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts, or that such protec-
tion is undesirable as a matter of policy. Difficult questions 
17 App., at 22. 
1 8 R espondent argues that the inventiveness of his process must be 
determined as of " the time the invention is made" undn § 103. and that, 
therefore, it is improper to judge the obviousn~s of his procpss by assess-
ing the application of the formula as though the formula were part of the 
prior art. This argument confu,;es the issue of patentable subject mat-
t er under § 101 with that of obviousness undPr § 103. Whether or not 
respondent 's formula can be clrnrnct Prized as '·obvious ." his process patent 
rests solel:I' on the cla im that his mathematical algorithm. when rPlated to 
a computer program, will improve the existing proce-t;S for updating alarm 
units. Very simply. our holding today i::: that a cl aim for an improved 
method of calculation , even when fi ed to a specifi c end use, i~ unpa.tentable 
subject matter under § 101. 
- -
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of policy concerning the kinds of programs that may be appro-
priate for patent protection and the form and duratiou of such 
protection can be answered by Congress on the basis of cur-
rent empirical data not equally available to this tribunal. 10 
It is our duty to construe the patent statutes as they now 
read. in light of our prior precedents, and we must proceed 
cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into 
areas wholly unforeseen by Congress. As MR. JusTICE WHITE 
explained in writing for the Court in Deepsouth Packing Co. 
v. Laitram Corp., 406 U. S .. 518, 531: 
"[W] e should not expand patent rights by overruling 
or modifying our prior cases construing the patent stat-
utes, unless the argument for expansion of privilege is 
based on more than mere inference from ambiguous 
statutory language. vVe would require a clear and cer-
tain signal from Congress before approving the position 
of a litigaut who. as respondent here, argues that the 
beachhead of privilege is wider, and the area of public 
use narrower. than the courts had previously thought. 
No such signal legitimizes respondent's position in this 
litigation." 
The judgment of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
is 
Reversed. 
19 Article,- a::;,;e,;,;ing the merits and demNit,; of patent protPction for 
computer programming arP 1111mE>ro11s . Sel', e. g .. Dnvi,;, ComputPr Pro-
grams and SubjPct MattPr Patentabilit~-- 6 R.utl,!er8 .Journal of Computers 
and the Law 1, and article:,; citPd therein, at :2 n. 5 (1976). Even among 
those who favor patental.iility of computer program:,:, then' i,; quP:--tioning 
of whether the 17-~·ear protection afforded b~- thP rurrent PatP11t Art i,; 
ri ther need Pd or appropriate. See id .. at 20 n. 1:3:3; :--ee genPrnll~- Com-
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-
Claim 1 of the patent describes the method as follows: 
13 
"1. A method for updating the value of at least one 
alarm limit on at least one process variable involved in 
a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of 
hydrocarbons wherein said alarm limit has a current 
value of 
Bo+K 
"wher;k Bo is the current alarm base and K is a predeter-.__,, 
mined alarm off set which comprises: 
'(1) Determining the present value of said process 
variable. said present value being defined as PVL; 
"(2) Determining a new alarm base, Bl, using the fol-
lowing equation: 
Bl =Bo ( 1.0-F) + PVL(F) 
"where F is a predeterm.i.ned number greater than zero 
and less than 1.0 ; 
"(3) Determining an updated alarm limit which is 
defined as Bl+K; and thereafter 
" ( 4) Adjusting said alarm limit to said updated alarm 
limit value." 
App., at 63. 
In order to use respondent's method for computing a new 
limit, the operator must make four decisions. Based on his 
knowledge of normal operating conditions. he first selects the 
original "alarm base" (Bo); if a temperature of 400 degrees 
is normal, that may be the alarm base. He next decides on 
an appropriate margin of safety. perhaps 50 degrees; that is 
his "alarm offset" (K). The sum of the alarm base and the 
alarm offset equals the alarm limit. Then he decides on the 
time interval that will elapse between each updating; that 
interval has no effect on the computation although it may. of 
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a weighting fact-0r (F) . which may be any number betwee11 
99 11/c alld 11/r .20 and which is used in the updating calculation. 
If the operator has decided in advance to use an original 
alarm base (Bo) of 400 degrees. a constant alarm offset (K) 
of 50 degrees. and a weighting factor (F) of 801{,. the only 
additional information he needs in order to compute an up-
dated alarm limit (lTAV). is the present value of the process 
variable (PVL) . Th e computation of the updated alarm 
limit accordiug to respondP,nt's method involves these three 
steps: 
First. at thr predetermined interval. the process variable 
is measured; if we assume the temperature is then 425 degrees, 
PVL will then rqual 425. 
Second. the solution of respondent's novel formula will pro-
duce a new alarm base (Bl) that will be a weighted average 
of the preceding alarm base (Bo) of 400 degrees and the cur~ 
rent temperature (PVL) of 425. It will be closer to one or-
the other depending on the value of the weighting factor (F) 
selected by the operator. If F is 80% . that percentage of 425 
(340) plus 207, (1-F) of 400 (80) will produce a new alarm 
base of 420 degrees. 
Third. the alarm offset (K) of 50 degrees is then added to 
the new alarm hase (Bl) of 420 to produce the updated alarm 
limit (lTAV) of 470. 
The process is repeated at the selected time intervals. In 
each updating computation. the most recently calculated 
alarm base and the current measurement of the process varia-
ble will be subRtituted for the corresponding numbers in the 
original calculation. but the alarm offset and the weighting 
factor will remain constant. 
20 :More precisely, it is defined a;; a number greater than 0, but less 
t han 1. 
"' J"""" ... - - / 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Nancy June 9, 1978 
RE: Parker v. Flook--JPS' opinion 
I find this case no more comprehensible now than 
I did at the time of argument. As you will see from my 
marginal notations, it is not entirely clear to me why 
resp's claimed invention is not statutory subject matter 
under§ 101, rather than being not novel or obvious under 
§§ 102 or 103. 
Yet I've been reassured by clerks who seem to 
understand this case(~-~-, Frank Blake,~ JPS' clerk; 
and MileB Rubhberg, 'IM's clerk) that the opinion will not 
i nven tive 
extend to cases where the process itself is a novel or/ -
application of a mathematical (or other) idea; and this is -
the sense I get from the opinion. Therefore, its impact ------- ,,-, ,,,,,_, ,--, -
should be fairly narrow. 
As a practical matter, this~ &8 supposed invention 
H8HisxR8kxm should not be patentable, whether the barrier 
is found in§ 101 or §i 102 or 103. Since it is conceded 
that the 81~ only point of novelty (if any) is in the 
mathematical formula, it seems unwise to make the patent 
~ ~--.-
examiners go through the motions. ARBJxfiRaii~l 
Miles raised one problem that I think is well-taken. 
-p~ p. 13, JPS talks about computer programs. I think everyone 
~ agrees thee while resp's invention could be implemented by 
- - ........ - -
2. 
means of computer, it does not have to be; and the 
case does not raise the broader question whether computer 
programs are patentable. For example, there might be a 
case in which the use and combination of new computer 
programs could achieve a completely new and useful 
practical result, and it's an open question .tH whether 
such an "invention" would constitute x.t.t statutory 
subject matter. The Court should not foreclose that inquiry .. -------- -in this case, and I doubt that JPS means to do so. 
I do not know exactly what change should be made, but you 
might ask JPS if w he would consider amending the paragraph 
on p. 13 so as not to imply that the Court is deciding that 
computer programs are not patentable under the patent laws 
as they ax now stand. 
P.S. If you are in doubt about this case, you might want 
tow await PS' dissent; but since the vote is 5-4, and I'm 
sure there would be questions about the merits of PS' position 
just as there are about JPS', I assume that you will not 
switch sides and thereby deprive JPS of a Court. I'll 
leave this up to you. 
-
CH .AMB E RS O F 
JU STI CE B YRON R. WHITE 
-
~u:p-rmt.t <lf ottr± cf tlf t ~tb ~htlta 
~as!rmghm. ~- (4. 21Jffe)l.' 
June 12, 1978 
Re: 77-642 - Parker v. Flook 
Dear John, 
I cast a very shaky vote to affirm in 
this case but have been unsettled about it. 
Your opinion, which I have examined with 
some care, now impresses me as the better 
view, but I shall await the dissent before 
coming to rest. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 




- -.:§u:µum.t (!Icttrl of tq~ 1!inittb .§htltg 
~aglp:ttgfon. ~- (!I. 2.llffe)J.~ 
C H AM BERS OF' 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN June 12,7 
Re: No. 77-642 - Parker v. Flook 
Dear John: 
Please join me. 
Since rely, 
I~ 
Mr. Justice Stevens 




.;§u:punu <!}ourl of tlrt 'J!foitt~ ;§mug 
~a!.lfp:nghm.10. <!}. 2!lffeJ!.J 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE June 12, 1978 
Re: 77-642 - Parker v. Flook 
Dear John, 
Please join me in your 
opinion in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
~ -
-- -
June 13 ;~ 1978 
No. 77-642 Parker v. Flook 
John: 
Pl ease jojn me. 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS Of" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
-
Dear Potter: 
• .§np-ttntt <!Jcnrl of tqt ~ h .§taus-
~ M fr:nghttt. tI). QJ. 20 ffe )!. ~ 
June 13, 1978 
Re: 77-642 Parker v. Flook 
/ 
I join your dissent. I continue to find this a hard, 
close case. I suspect we have not heard the last of this 
type of patent application in such a swiftly developing 
field. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
Regey'.i::'ds, 
-
! ·~ -,)-~ ·~r ~ ! " ~ ,I' ·,. 1, 
I ~ l'1 l ~ ~> 
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